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Abstract  
This paper aims to unpack the equity implications of ‘climate-smart agriculture’ (CSA). The 
CSA approach has gained considerable traction in recent years, but remains highly contested. 
One of the principal areas of contestation relates to CSA’s contribution to social equity, yet 
equity is rarely defined in the CSA literature. To fill this gap, we apply an equity framework 
to four discourses that are commonly encountered in debates on the challenges and 
opportunities for applying CSA in different contexts and for different purposes. From this, we 
identify three important equity issues: First, distributive equity implies a need to acknowledge 
how CSA may transfer the burden of responsibility for climate change mitigation to 
marginalized producers and resource managers. Second, a procedural equity perspective 
reveals how CSA discourses generally fail to confront entrenched power relations that may 
constrain or block the emergence of more ‘pro-poor’ forms of agricultural development, 
adaptation to climate change, or carbon sequestration and storage. Third, to improve CSA 
outcomes, a focus on contextual equity means the need to pay more attention to the 
institutions that underpin the bargaining power of the poorest and most vulnerable groups, as 
well as a deeper acknowledgement of the political nature of transformations that are needed to 
address challenges around the agricultural sector in a changing climate.  
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1. Introduction 
Climate-Smart Agriculture (CSA) is based on the idea of ‘triple wins’ and synergies between 
enhancing adaptation, improving mitigation and increasing food security (FAO 2010, 2013, 
2016; World Bank 2012). The assumption is that there are a multitude of practices that could 
lead to improvements across mitigation and adaptation while also enhancing food security, 
that are greater than the sum of its parts (FAO 2013). Over the past few years, CSA has 
gained considerable traction in policy and research circles (Lipper et al. 2014), directing new 
attention and resources to the agricultural sector, globally as well as at country levels. Today, 
more than 30 countries, most prominently in Sub-Saharan Africa, specifically refer to CSA in 
their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions agreed at the U.N. Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP21) in Paris in 
December 2015 (FAO 2016). This growth in interest and funding for CSA has been 
accompanied by the emergence of new global and regional networks, notably The Global 
Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture (GACSA), the Africa CSA Alliance, as well as a 
multitude of conferences, panels and online discussion fora. There is also a growing literature 
assessing field experiences with climate-smart agriculture (Lipper et al. 2014; Rosenstock et 
al. 2016).  
From the outset, however, CSA has been a contested concept, with critics raising concerns 
around how it may undermine the livelihoods of smallholder farmers, promote genetically 
modified crops at the expense of traditional crop varieties, or lead to accelerated ‘land grabs’ 
by corporate interests and local elites (Stabinsky 2014; Suppan and Sharma 2011; Caron and 
Treyer 2016). Critiques range from those highlighting its negative effects on ecosystems and 
biodiversity to those arguing that it can undermine cultural heritage and social equity.  
In this paper, we probe the political economy of CSA by examining who mobilizes the 
concept, with what assumptions and for what purposes in order to evaluate the implications 
for social equity. Key to the contestation around CSA is that it may be achieved through a 
number of different pathways, with widely diverging technologies, processes and actors. 
Given its broad definition, the approach is not prescriptive beyond the focus on attaining its 
‘triple wins’. This sets it apart from other major concepts such as conservation agriculture, 
which is defined as a set of practices, including continuous minimum mechanical soil 
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disturbance; permanent organic soil cover; and diversification of crop species grown in 
sequences or associations (Kimaro et al. 2016), or agroecology, the application of ecological 
principles to the production of food, fuel, fibre and the management of agroecosystems. 
Hence, what actions and activities are rendered as being ‘climate smart’, and what triple wins 
actually mean and for whom, are shaped by who interprets the term and how it is applied; in 
short, reflecting power relations within societies. As such, CSA is not a new agricultural 
system, nor a new set of practices. What is new are first, the aims and intentions to link with 
mitigation, and second, the integration of the three goals, both of which are highly 
contentious. In order to understand the equity implications of CSA, it is crucial to keep these 
intentions and goals in focus as they profoundly shape how CSA plays out on the ground. To 
limit our discussion, we focus on four narratives found within CSA: mitigation as a policy 
mechanism, agricultural development, agri-business, and community-based approaches. 
Equity is chosen because concerns and claims regarding social equity are central to CSA, both 
among those supporting and opposing it. As a policy goal concerned with simultaneously 
achieving adaptation, mitigation and food security, equity underpins climate policy as well as 
agricultural and development aims, notably in the Paris Agreement and in the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). Social equity and gender are often mentioned as important 
components of achieving climate-smart agriculture, as well as in guidelines for how to carry 
out and govern implementation of CSA (FAO 2013; Vermeulen 2015). Some also see CSA as 
a new opportunity to address long standing equity challenges for smallholder farmers. On the 
other hand, a range of civil society actors in particular consider the goal and emerging 
practice of CSA to be fundamentally incompatible with equity goals, disproportionally 
benefitting large-scale actors at the expense of poor and marginalised smallholder farmers. An 
example is the argument that there is a direct trade-off between effectiveness and equity 
(Taylor 2017). As Neufeldt et al. (2013: 3) point out, given the breadth of what might be 
termed ‘Climate-Smart Agriculture’, there is no guarantee that CSA practices lead to 
improved outcomes: “Reducing GHG emissions or improving resilience may not always 
result in the best natural resource management outcomes if consequences include biodiversity 
loss, degradation of cultural heritage, increased social inequity or long-term ecosystem 
instability”. The authors argue for a “safe operating space” for CSA, defined as a “set of 
conditions that demonstrably better meet human needs in the short and long term within 
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foreseeable local and planetary limits and holds ourselves accountable for outcomes across 
temporal and spatial scales” (ibid: 3). 
Common to these concerns and arguments, however, is that what equity means in the context 
of CSA is poorly theorised (Taylor 2017). Assumptions underpinning the linkages between 
CSA and equity are therefore left implicit, weakening the arguments from either side on the 
equity implications of CSA; i.e. the potential of CSA to either support or undermine equity 
goals. Furthermore, contrary to Neufeldt et al. (2013), we suggest that ‘safe operating spaces’ 
are not only impossible to identify but also problematically assume that benefits for all can be 
achieved. This lack of conceptual underpinning is important in view of the significant 
investment in CSA to date, and the expected increase in CSA implementation over coming 
years.  
To address this gap, the paper examines three essential dimensions of equity (distributional, 
procedural and contextual), in relation to four key contending discourses surrounding CSA, 
and how these discourses can exercise visible, hidden and invisible power (Lukes 1974) with 
rather contradictory effects. We draw these three dimensions from the literature on climate 
justice and related debates in environmental governance and conservation (cf. McDermott et 
al. 2013; Schreckenberg et al. 2016). Together, they allow us to ask questions about who is 
considered responsible for climate change goals, how that maps onto historical and present 
day inequalities in emissions and burdens for mitigation, and how and by whom the goals of 
CSA are assumed to be enforced. We do this by examining the main narratives (and counter- 
and sub-narratives), the associated networks of actors and their power relations, and how they 
have shaped actions and field-level activities on CSA.  
Through these, we examine the implications these contestations raise for its application in 
shaping agricultural sector priorities and practices in a changing climate. Our starting point is 
that CSA can be seen as a discourse, or narrative, where debates – and outcomes – are 
influenced by the actors’ underlying ideas and ideologies, as well as the activities and 
priorities a ‘climate smart’ discourse sanctions. Such narratives exercise power through their 
ability to focus attention on some issues over others, defining the scope of a problem, and at 
what scale it should be addressed, and the range of possible solutions to be pursued (Lukes 
1974; Nightingale 2003; Keeley and Scoones 2003). In turn, the power of CSA discourses is 
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both to directly shape different actors’ control and access to resources, as well as promoting 
equity goals or reproducing inequities.  
We argue that CSA should be conceptualised explicitly as a contested social-political process 
that mediates how individuals and collectives deal with multiple types of simultaneously 
occurring agronomic, environmental and social changes. Our conceptualisation builds on 
perspectives that view CSA not as a single decision or measure, but as a process wherein 
social and political relations shape the simultaneous management of diverse changes, many of 
which are not driven directly or consciously by climate change (Pelling 2011). As such, 
climate change mitigation and adaptation should not be separated from other kinds of change 
to which societies respond, nor should uncertainty and change in agricultural systems be 
considered as something new that only emerged with climate change (Eriksen et al. 2015). 
Perhaps most importantly, the discourses around CSA reflect strongly polarised positions that 
leave little middle ground. It is assumed to be either a transformative approach that will lead 
to the emergence of more sustainable and climate-resilient forms of agriculture (cf. FAO 
2016; Lipper et al. 2014) or a rebranding of techno-managerial approaches to ‘business as 
usual’ commercial agricultural practices (cf. Stabinsky 2014). This paper argues that both 
these discourses reflect a profound shift in responsibility for climate change mitigation and 
poverty alleviation from international and regional actors to national governments and 
particularly to local producers and resource managers, who are increasingly categorised as the 
front-line defence against climate change. It is therefore crucial to probe what practices and 
networks are formed on the ground in response to these discourses of CSA.  
From this, we argue that an analysis of equity brings out three major areas of concern. First, 
the vagueness of CSA goals has left considerable scope for actors to make unrealistic and 
unsupported claims about the likely positive developmental outcomes and impacts resulting 
from implementation. Despite recent shifts in the rhetoric around the approach, a large share 
of CSA-labelled activities is still focused primarily on mitigation and assume that benefits 
will flow to more or less automatically to those who need it. This has led to the shifting of 
responsibility on climate change mitigation efforts from international and regional actors to 
national governments and more nefariously, to poor local producers and resource managers 
who are ill equipped to respond. CSA measures and the costs and benefits that accrue from 
their application will ultimately be politically negotiated, raising questions around who sets 
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the terms of the agenda and how the poorest and most vulnerable groups are involved or 
excluded from decisions that affect their resources and their livelihoods. Thus, while some 
may see ‘triple wins’, CSA may involve significant trade-offs with equity goals, creating 
winners and losers in the process.  
Second, while CSA is often portrayed as a force for transforming the agricultural sector, 
evidence suggests that it is unlikely to fundamentally shift power to address the key factors 
that constrain or block the emergence of more ‘pro-poor’ agricultural development, adaptation 
to climate change, or carbon sequestration and storage. The dominant focus on market-based 
transformations in particular may lead to new risks and vulnerabilities, and entrench already 
unequal power relations. Third, we argue that to improve CSA outcomes, more attention 
needs to be given to the institutions that underpin the bargaining power of the poorest and 
most vulnerable groups, as well as a deeper acknowledgement of the political nature of 
transformations that are needed to address challenges around the agricultural sector in a 
changing climate.  
An analysis of the political economy of discourses on CSA and their implications, we believe, 
brings important evidence to the debate and helps broaden dialogues with government and 
non-government actors who are invested in promoting the approach. If the goals of CSA are 
to be achieved – increasing food security and adaptive capacity among the poorest and most 
vulnerable groups, while simultaneously capitalizing on agriculture’s mitigation potential – it 
is important to understand both how the concept has emerged and how it has been used, by 
whom, and with what consequences, for whom. Through this analysis, we are aiming to direct 
attention to opportunities for new knowledge, solutions and actors to emerge that may have 
been excluded to date, yet which may be important for achieving CSA policy goals.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief background to the 
emergence of climate-smart agriculture, providing a summary of its conceptual origins and its 
rise as a global agricultural development priority. This is followed by the introduction of the 
analytical framework focused on the three dimensions of equity and a discussion of its 
relevance to ongoing debates on CSA. Section 4 introduces the key discourses associated with 
different aspects of the CSA agenda and their chief protagonists associated with each of these. 
The final section compares and contrasts these contending discourses and draws out a set of 
conclusions for policy and practice. 
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2. The emergence of climate-smart agriculture 
The concept of climate-smart agriculture emerged in the context of increasing concern over 
food security in view of raising global populations, and the impact of climate change (FAO 
2009). The concern centred on the fact that the global population is expected to increase by 
around 2 billion people, putting increasing pressure on agriculture by the middle of the 21st 
century. A commonly cited figure is that agricultural production will need to increase 60 
percent by 2050 even in the absence of climate change to meet projected demand (FAO 2009, 
Campbell et al. 2016).  
In its first major report, the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) in 
2009 stated that CSA “(…) contributes to the achievement of sustainable development goals 
by integrating the three dimensions of sustainable development (economic, social and 
environmental) by: (1) sustainably increasing agricultural productivity and incomes; (2) 
adapting and building resilience to climate change; and (3) reducing and/or removing 
greenhouse gases emissions, where possible (FAO 2013). It went on to define CSA is “an 
approach to developing the technical, policy and investment conditions to achieve sustainable 
agricultural development for food security under climate change…” (FAO 2013: ix-x). 
From the outset, however, CSA represented a recognition of the possible contributions of 
agriculture to emissions reductions (Mann et al. 2009). This was rooted in the unique role of 
the agricultural sector as both a leading contributor to carbon emissions as well as a sector 
with high vulnerability to climate change. Agriculture is thus both a major ‘victim’ by being 
severely exposed to impacts of climate change, as well as a ‘villain’ in being a major 
contributor to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Smith and Olesen 2010; Hedger 2011; 
Vermeulen et al. 2012). For example, globally, 22 per cent of the cultivated area for the most 
important crops and 56 per cent in Sub Saharan Africa is projected to experience negative 
impacts from climate change by 2050 (Campbell et al. 2016). Often-cited figures is that 
global yields of maize and wheat have already decreased by 3.8 and 5.5 percent respectively 
(ibid). At the same time, an estimated 10-12 percent of the global GHG emissions come from 
crop production. Therefore, the climate change mitigation potential from agriculture is 
considerable, and it presents a strong case for the key role for agriculture in any interventions 
or solutions to tackling climate change (ibid).   
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CSA did not arrive in a political vacuum, it entered arenas with major contestations and long-
standing (and often entrenched) positions around the aims and means of agricultural 
development (Sumberg and Thompson 2012). These include, but are not limited to, 
discussions over the past decades around multifunctional agriculture, sustainable land 
management, sustainable intensification, agroecological approaches, and conservation 
agriculture, to name a few (Thompson and Scoones 2009; Sumberg, et al. 2013).  
It is beyond dispute that agriculture must be central to any strategy for tackling climate 
change and its impacts. Yet, when analysing how CSA is imagined by different actors and 
communities of practice, it becomes clear that the envisaged gains and trade-offs vary 
considerably and attract some of the sharpest critiques from detractors. While several 
international organisations, including the FAO, the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD), the World Bank and a number of international agricultural research 
centres and programmes (such as the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF), and the CGIAR’s 
Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security Research Program (CCAFS), have endorsed 
CSA as a policy goal, other groups of actors have levelled sharp criticisms. These include, but 
are not limited to: challenging its ethical grounds in increasing smallholder participation in 
carbon markets, its emphasis on technology development and transfer, the prevalence of 
support for agro-industrial expansion, and the exclusion of smallholder voices and priorities 
(e.g. Atela 2012; Suppan and Sharma 2011; Anderson 2014; Pearce 2011). Initial scepticism 
also centred on the manner in which agriculture was introduced in the climate negotiations, 
predominantly focusing on mitigation and bound up with contested issues relating to 
agricultural trade (Caron and Treyer 2016; Stabinsky 2014). Arguably, many of the critiques 
were based not on evidence of how CSA would appear on the ground, but rather the emphasis 
in CSA strategies, as well as the track-record of the leading organisations promoting CSA, 
notably the World Bank (Suppan and Sharma 2011; Taylor 2017). This in turn led to concerns 
that initiatives focused on climate change and agriculture, including CSA, were introducing 
emission reduction targets ‘through the back door’ for some of the poorest and most 
vulnerable farmers in the world (Chinsinga et al. 2012).  
The World Bank and various UN bodies have embraced the CSA agenda and initiated 
projects to showcase its potential (World Bank 2012; FAO 2014). With examples from 
Africa, South and South East Asia and South America, they have identified a variety of 
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practices that can be incorporated under the CSA framework for example: introducing cash 
crops to subsistence farmers, improving irrigation capacity and efficiency, training in 
sustainable resource management, carbon sequestration and mitigation, introducing energy-
efficient cooking stoves to reduce deforestation, reforestation through plantation schemes, 
construction of biogas digesters, improving genetic diversity, creating CSA readiness though 
environmental education and awareness making, improving efficiency in fertilizer use, foster 
technology transfer and innovation, and making markets more accessible (FAO 2014). Within 
these, there is potential for very wide interpretations of what CSA is or should be, and indeed, 
it reads a bit like a laundry list of natural resource related development schemes over the past 
thirty years.  
Because these activities are so diverse and encompass such a wide array of activities with 
widely diverging objectives, several scholars have argued that CSA leans on a poorly 
understood and somewhat tenuous relationship between mitigation, adaptation and food 
security, and hence serves to justify nearly any agricultural practice to be ‘climate smart’ 
(Neufeldt et al. 2013), or at least constructed as such. This argument finds some merit as our 
review of recent literature reveals that CSA is used by advocates of activities spanning fields 
of sustainable intensification, agroforestry, agroecology, conservation agriculture, tenure 
formalisation and land titling, carbon sequestration and REDD+ programs, knowledge 
creation and dissemination, market integration, technology innovation and transfer, and the 
use of fertilizers, pesticides and genetically modified (GM) crops.  
Several scholars have noted that CSA activities tend to focus on industrial agricultural 
practices where the biggest emission reduction gains can be found, rather than on improving 
food access or reducing vulnerability (Adekola and Terdoo 2014; Anderson 2014). In 
comparison to industrialised contexts, the per capita contribution to global climate change is 
low in agrarian societies, and at the same time, poverty levels are high and vulnerabilities to 
the effects of climate change significant (Stabinsky 2014). These inequalities in tandem with 
the fact that the ‘Global North’ carries the historical responsibility for anthropogenic climate 
change makes it politically controversial to connect climate change interventions to farming 
practices in the global South. Following this argument, some claim that reconciling 
adaptation, food security and mitigation is not viable from a historical responsibility or 
climate justice point of view (Stabinsky 2014). Here, we see clearly how different discourses 
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of CSA are used to frame the same problem differently by differently positioned actors. It is 
remarkable how CSA has circulated so widely and so quickly globally, notwithstanding 
criticisms from predominantly social scientists and civil society organisations. 
Recent activity on CSA has arguably responded to some of this critique, notably with more 
emphasis on landscape-centred approaches that focus on CSA benefits to be found at larger 
scales, not project or programme level, avoiding situations where mitigation and adaptation 
actions are artificially combined, resulting in sub-optimal outcomes (Harvey et al. 2014). At 
the same time, many development NGOs, while being critical of aspects of CSA, have also 
taken up and made CSA ‘their own’, notably through smallholder-focused initiatives under 
CGIAR’s CCAFS (Bernier et al. 2013). An example of this wider engagement is also the 
‘Africa CSA Alliance’ (AACSA), which is convened by the African Union through NEPAD’s 
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and includes a range 
of international and regional agencies, governments, research bodies and civil society 
organisations. The Alliance is seeking to leverage existing CSA initiatives in several countries 
in the region to deliver results at scale and drive policy reform. However, to its critics, CSA 
remains an idiom to focus on efficient production along with governance structures that help 
to sustain the legitimacy of development as a metaphor for technology transfer and market 
integration, without addressing the underlying vulnerability of poor farmers. 
In 2014, more than 100 civil society organizations signed a joint letter rejecting the Global 
Alliance for Climate Smart Agriculture, arguing that it legitimises agro-industrial expansion 
and socially and environmentally destructive activities that increase GHG emissions. The 
criticism emphasized how the vagueness of CSA allows the agri-business sector to use 
GACSA as a platform for image making and agro-industrial expansion. Further, since carbon 
offsetting and revenues from carbon trading schemes are necessary to fund CSA, this would 
create a demand for carbon capturing lands in the Global South and lead to land 
dispossessions for populations without recognizable property rights. A third category of 
critique argued that GACSA places mitigation burdens on the most vulnerable populations 
(Anderson 2014, Via Campesina 2014). 
In this way, these counter narratives consider CSA to be a ‘green-washing’ project and a 
prolongation of the Green Revolution, resulting in increased indebtedness, vulnerability, 
GHG emissions and environmental degradation. Using historical narratives of injustice and 
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development failures, proponents of this discourse re-politicise the debate, and show that CSA 
prevents recognition of radical change and masks structural impediments for pro-poor 
development (Via Campesina 2014; Anderson 2014). Via Campesina (2014), for instance, has 
argued that CSA is “part of a larger process of ‘green’ structural adjustment projects required 
by an economic system and the political elites in distress, because they have exhausted other 
places for enormous speculative financial investments and now see agriculture and 
agricultural land as the new frontier.” The argument is that it is exactly the practices that CSA 
engenders which create food insecurity in the first place, namely reliance on agro-industrial 
practices and corporate control over inputs and seed stocks. 
3. Theorizing equity in the context of climate-smart 
agriculture 
To understand the equity implications of CSA, we need to analytically link different aspects 
of equity with CSA as a discourse that influences policy and practice. That is to say, to probe 
the systemic ways that CSA as a concept constructed around ‘triple wins’ is adopted by a 
variety of actors, re-articulated in policy and translated into practice. While a range of 
practices may be deemed ‘climate smart’ from the narrowly defined perspective of adaptation, 
mitigation and food security, the question is: to what extent they can also be considered 
equitable, and if so, according to what understanding of equity? Who is defining the goals? 
Whose responsibility? Who is ultimately accountable? Who wins and who loses?  
Our approach sits in opposition to rational-positivist-linear views, in which assumptions are 
made that technical knowledge is available and communicated to policy-makers, who then 
make policies grounded in a thorough understanding of ‘the problem’ (Keeley and Scoones 
2003). We rather consider policy processes as incremental, complex and ‘messy’, involving 
actors with often competing goals and interests, which invoke evidence provided by research 
in less than straightforward or transparent ways (Keeley and Scoones 2003; Tanner and 
Allouche 2011). Our goal is to understand how such processes impinge on equity by 
privileging some priorities over others, and through which some actors have the power to 
better assert their visions of what ‘climate smart agriculture’ means in practice. 
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Over the past 10 years, the climate change-agriculture policy area has been characterised by a 
large number of actors that have diverging preferences, priorities and concerns. Most actors 
are not new, neither are the solutions proposed as the laundry list of CSA activities presented 
above shows. This situation resembles what Jordan et al. (2013: 164) describe as “an 
unpredictable assortment of ideas, problems, solutions and decision-making priorities 
jockeying for attention”. Thus, while we are prone to think that policy reflects a desired 
condition that generates distinct kinds of projects, it is rather the case that projects conducted 
by institutions, networks and actors provide the evidence for promulgating policies. In this 
way, CSA practices are shaped by existing actors and activities as much as they are shaped by 
novel policy work.  
When seeing climate change and agriculture as an integrated policy complex, the implications 
are significant both environmentally and socially for those who are affected, and financially 
for those who may stand to gain from climate or CSA funding. The CSA concept thus fits 
with the description of a ‘wicked’ problem (Turnpenny et al. 2009), situations where only 
partial solutions are possible; where stakes are high and decisions urgent, but where facts are 
uncertain and values are disputed. These characteristics of wicked problems tend to create 
spaces for powerful actors to use the uncertainty to define problems and the ‘allowable range’ 
of solutions. Wicked problems are also often characterised by trade-offs and the potential for 
unintended consequences (Campbell et al. 2016).  
Yet, as policies are focused on stabilizing an interpretation of how to implement change 
(Fischer 2003), they have to be coherent across actors, interests and scales. Policies achieve 
this coherence by drawing on discourses that are adequately flexible and ambiguous, and give 
enough room to manoeuvre for parties with different goals and interests. Policies need to be 
packaged and sold to fit prevailing worldviews. Thus, when it comes to translating policy into 
practice, the mobilizing narratives that drive policy making, such as ‘sustainability’ or ‘triple 
wins’, may recede into the distance in favour of direct impacts achieved through political 
relationships and management procedures that can be included in narratives of ‘success’ 
(Sumberg et al. 2012). In other words, projects may favour strategies with demonstrable 
results over more risky innovations intended to produce ‘triple wins’. Recent work has shown 
how such processes – through a variety of mechanisms - may push the debate in certain 
directions that bring some opportunities but close down others, jeopardizing goals of 
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implementation (Ojha et al. 2015). This can set policy on pathways that lead to outcomes 
shaped by these, but not necessarily reflecting the original aims (Leach et al. 2010). 
To probe the equity implications of CSA in any meaningful way, we therefore need to take 
into account this non-linear, political character of policy processes. We do this by examining 
how different actors interpret CSA principles and construct narratives that frame problems 
and solutions. This has important equity implications because as argued above, narratives 
drive activities and define outcomes on the ground through informing policy and translating 
into practice in local contexts. As Schmink and Wood (1987: 51) note, ideas are never 
innocent but “either reinforce or challenge existing social and economic arrangements”. In 
line with this argument, we suggest that while there is nothing fundamentally ‘new’ in CSA, 
the discourses of CSA serve to reorient climate change mitigation and adaptation on certain 
issues, which may change or reinforce current inequities. This reorientation highlights the 
need to ‘insert’ power and politics into the CSA debate in order to probe the ways CSA 
travels and transmutes across scales, how various actors use it and for what purposes, how it 
informs policy and materializes on the ground, and ultimately who have been the winners and 
losers in this process. As Raik et al. (2008: 731) notes, 
“While much technical knowledge of natural systems is applied to practice in supposedly 
neutral, disinterested ways, much professional practice operates—sometimes 
intentionally, sometimes unintentionally—to exclude, dominate, marginalize, or 
otherwise disadvantage some groups.” 
The discourses used by different actors are shaped by their backgrounds and interests, and 
will determine the types of evidence and knowledge that is included or excluded, the types of 
priorities that are being made, and by whom (Nightingale 2005). Scholarly work has also 
shown how debates on complex social and environmental issues are often closed down – 
sometimes very quickly – around certain types of discourses and solutions, effectively 
blocking alternative narratives and actors (Leach et al. 2010). 
In our effort to capture such dynamics our framework thus puts emphasis on different 
narratives and their histories on CSA, and examines how they are framed, what kinds of 
knowledge and evidence they draw upon, the associated actors, and the kinds of policies and 
practices to which they are linked (Keeley and Scoones 2003; Wolmer et al. 2006).  
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We use a framework focused on three dimensions of equity, informed by broader 
conceptualisations of equity and resource access (McDermott et al. 2013; Schreckenberg et al. 
2016). Equity is conceptualised in the UNFCCC through the Convention’s reference to 
“common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”. There has been a 
considerable discussion around what this means at global, national and sub-national levels, 
ranging from, on the one hand, utilitarian and effectiveness-related arguments, to moral and 
rights-based arguments on the other (Adger et al. 2006).  
Following McDermott et al. (2013), we look at three aspects of equity; distributive, 
procedural and contextual. Distributive equity is focused on distribution of costs, risks and 
benefits and has strong correlation with the economic dimensions of equity (McDermott et al. 
2013; Schreckenberg et al. 2016). We here consider distributive equity to relate to the sharing 
of benefits and costs and risks emanating from CSA interventions, importantly around who 
the intended beneficiaries are, and how interventions are justified. These may include both 
instrumental or efficiency concerns, as well as rules- or moral-based concerns. For each of the 
discourses, we ask whether and how there is attention to winners and losers, how these are 
justified (e.g. based on efficiency or needs of the poorest), and whether there are benefits and 
burden-sharing arrangements in place.  
The second component, procedural equity, is about participation and representation in 
decision-making processes, which may include, on the one hand, guaranteeing equal basic 
rights among all actors, and on the other, positive bias to marginalised or excluded social 
groups (McDermott et al. 2013). We here interrogate the CSA discourses with respect to 
whether and how they define the role of relevant stakeholders, accountability for decisions, 
responsibility for actions, and how meaningful participation is ensured for relevant actors, in 
particular those who are the most vulnerable and most in need of support.  
Finally, contextual equity is about recognising how different actors have different access, 
capabilities and power to gain from a given intervention or mechanism.  (McDermott et al. 
2013). We understand this here to be about considerations of root causes for vulnerability to 
climate-related risks, people’s ability to access mitigation-focused interventions such as low 
carbon technologies, as well as constraints and barriers to benefitting from agricultural 
development. Thus, we here map to what extent different discourses acknowledge such 
underlying, pre-existing barriers (whether social, political or economic).  
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The paper is based upon a review of scientific and ‘grey’ literature on CSA, with a focus on 
the period from 2009 to August 2016. Given that CSA is a relatively new concept, few studies 
have so far engaged in empirical investigations of outcomes of CSA practices (but see recent 
review by Rosenstock et al. 2016). Thus, our paper is not an attempt to assess actual value and 
implications of CSA in practice, rather, we are interested in how equity, in its different 
dimensions, appear in the arguments and narratives that engender and create a discursive base 
CSA policy and practice. These different discourses will also lead to different outcomes, 
making an examination of the discourses themselves useful in understanding the impacts CSA 
is having on the ground. 
The document analysis was guided by an aspiration to identify the overall key narratives, 
potential overlaps, and sub- and counter-narratives at play in CSA debates. In particular we 
paid close attention to: relative emphasis on adaptation, mitigation and food security; the 
ways that synergies and triple wins are constructed; the extent to which political 
considerations are included; whether gender, youth and equity concerns are included; whether 
links to other issues on agricultural development (such as land, water, tenure) are made; 
whether emphasis is put on production of or access to food; and at what scale the ‘problems’ 
and associated ‘solutions’ are believed to lie.  
Considering that CSA is designed to inform policy goals and desirable outcomes (i.e. triple 
wins and synergies between food security, adaptation and mitigation), those who take up the 
idea of CSA can define the means and measures to be adopted. In addition to the UN (notably 
the FAO) and the World Bank, a large number of national governments, NGOs and private 
sector companies have taken up CSA’s ‘triple wins’ agenda, and formed new institutional 
bodies working to operationalize and implement CSA practices across the Global South. 
Others, however, have come out in stark opposition to the concept. As we shall see, this has 
created a contested space around CSA, wherein a multitude of actors assert how it should be 
understood and implemented and divergent conceptualizations of CSA underpinning 
organisationally driven programs and agendas.  
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4. Equity in four climate-smart agriculture narratives 
In the following, we examine four key diverging discourses of CSA in view of equity, tracing 
their lineage and current formulation. The four narratives are focused on mitigation, 
agricultural development, agro-industry and carbon markets, and community-based 
approaches. These discourses are distinctive with respect to their relative emphasis across 
mitigation, adaptation and food security. They also differ in their historical trajectories and 
entry points to climate change-agriculture linkages, their justification, associated actors, 
knowledge and actions, scale and outcomes. While there is no watertight separation between 
these, and there are elements of overlap across them, they serve to highlight some of the key 
ways CSA interventions look like.  
4.1 CSA as mitigation policy mechanism 
The basic starting point for CSA was, as mentioned above, the unique dual role of the 
agricultural sector both as a cause of greenhouse gas emissions, and by implication climate 
change, and as susceptible to impacts from climate change and its effects. CSA was thus 
intended to address both aspects. The recognition of this dual role was also the key motivation 
for a separate agricultural programme under the UNFCCC. While notionally focused on the 
‘triple wins’, in practice the primary emphasis was on addressing the twin challenges of 
adaptation and mitigation, and with a particular focus from the outset on mitigation (Mann et 
al. 2009). Added to this, discussions related to climate change and agriculture came in under 
mitigation-focused sections of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice 
(SBSTA) of the UNFCCC. This raises concerns for distributive equity in investments 
favouring large-scale interventions to maximise carbon benefits over concerns for the 
livelihoods of smallholders. While proponents were quick to point out the triple win potential 
and the link to food security, the carbon benefit was paramount in agricultural projects 
identified as ‘climate-smart’. For example, the Kenya Agricultural Carbon Project involves 
the adoption of sustainable agricultural land management practices by smallholder farmer 
groups to generate increased crop yields, farm productivity and soil carbon sequestration (as 
well as above-ground carbon sequestration) on approximately 45,000 ha in Nyanza and 
Western Provinces of Kenya (Atela 2012).  
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Many questions were raised about the ethics of promoting climate change mitigation within 
agricultural practices in the Global South, where people are least responsible for carbon 
emissions. Based on the original conception of CSA, the counter-argument was that it serves 
to justify on-farm mitigation and sequestration programs with reference to synergies with 
adaptation and food security. Critics (e.g. Delvaux et al. 2014; Stabinsky 2014; Anderson 
2014) argue that these should be considered co-benefits rather than the main objectives of 
CSA, and the result is that on-farm mitigation is rendered less contentious as it can be 
considered a ‘climate-smart’ activity sanctioned by the FAO. Since the initial backlash against 
CSA, culminating at the Durban Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Climate Convention 
in 2011, some of the key proponents toned down the language and the CSA definition was 
revised to state that GHG emissions should be reduced and removed ‘where possible’ (FAO 
2013). 
The fallout from this discussion helps explain why many CSA advocates now put emphasis 
mainly on food security and adaptation measures, rather than mitigation. For example, we 
observed a CSA initiative in Nepal that has promoted new micro technologies for increasing 
vegetable crop yields, more efficient grain processing technologies and rehabilitation of 
traditional ponds used for livestock and irrigation among other adaptation measures (LiBird, 
personal communication 2015). 
Accordingly, the priority in this discourse is on improving livelihoods and adaptive capacity 
of poor and vulnerable farmers. Mitigation largely remains a potential ‘synergy effect’ or ‘co-
benefit’ of interventions targeting adaptation of food security. Other commentators have 
followed this argument. Neufeldt et al. (2013), for instance, point out that food insecure 
farmers lack ability, capacity and capital to invest in CSA, and assert that the focus should be 
on creating incentives and opportunities for CSA by combining short-term wins (increased 
income and improved adaptive capacity) and long-term benefits (mitigation). This was also 
the central message in the first Global Science Conference on Climate-Smart Agriculture 
(GSCSA) held in Wageningen in 2011 (Wageningen Statement 2011). According to this 
discourse, then, food security, increased income and resilience must be prioritized over 
mitigation.  
Another concern from a distributive equity perspective is that within programs oriented 
towards adaptation, however, it is not clear that benefits are equally distributed or that burden-
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sharing arrangements are in place. In the Nepal example, there is a long history of addressing 
equity issues in natural resource management, there nevertheless is a tendency for 
interventions to focus on areas that are more accessible (i.e. near roads) and on households 
where take up of new technologies is more guaranteed (those with some literacy) (Nightingale 
2005). The LiBird project began in 2015 so it is far too soon to assess their practices. They 
have included a gender consultant within the program but there are more complex questions 
around which members of households benefit and how projects themselves can intervene in 
communities that are highly hierarchical. 
This CSA narrative also raises important procedural and contextual equity concerns. Despite 
an increasing focus on gender and social inclusion (Vermeulen 2015), there are issues around 
responsibility as well as to what extent CSA is set up to address historical root causes. 
Alongside the co-benefits approach to mitigation runs the equally significant issue of 
responsibility. FAO figures reveal that 74 per cent of all agricultural emissions originate in 
developing countries, and that 70 per cent of the agricultural mitigation potential can be 
realized in these same countries (Gattinger et al. 2012). This has brought some to argue that 
CSA is a direct response to this observation (Stabinsky 2014), and that the adaptation and 
food security components are used to alleviate the political controversy surrounding climate 
change interventions in the global South. Civil society organisations in particular have argued 
that CSA displaces mitigation responsibility from the global level and re-scales it onto local 
populations by situating the problem in the present and in current agricultural practices. This 
kind of logic ignores the historical origins of greenhouse gas emissions, not only from 
industry, but also from agriculture. Many of mitigation solutions suggested through CSA 
displace financially lucrative solutions and opportunities for positive change from local levels 
and rescale them onto global corporations and financial institutions. As Stabinsky (2014: 7) 
argues: “This framing conveniently ignores completely the enormous potential in the North 
for reducing fertilizer production and use and reducing meat production and consumption.” 
Such activities would also have significant mitigation effects and are directly related to 
agriculture. Approaching CSA from a mitigation perspective thus risks implying a focus on 
the potential to maximise carbon sequestration rather than on the more diffused practices of 
production and consumption. 
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It is perhaps not surprising that a large number of funded CSA interventions are focused on 
carbon sequestration in soils. In common with the revised CSA discourse, they attempt to 
make carbon sequestration beneficial not only from a global climate change perspective, but 
also from a short-term local livelihood perspective (c.f. Simpson 2012, Woelcke 2012). A 
recurring example in the literature is that farmers will earn ‘extra money’ from carbon offsets 
that will allow financially poor households to invest in adaptive capacity and improved 
farming techniques. Here, the springboard for adaptation and food security is the financial 
benefits from mitigation. In these discourses, we thus see the domain of ‘agriculture’ spread 
to forests and agroforestry as well. There is little questioning of how such efforts may 
transform property rights, management practices and access to everyday livelihood needs for 
small-scale farmers. 
4.2 Agricultural transformation 
The emergence of CSA happened in parallel with an increasing focus on food systems, and 
food security and agriculture in a context of a rapidly increasing global population. The key 
motivation in this discourse is how to increase food production by 60 percent by 2050 to 
accommodate a projected global population of nine billion (FAO 2009). The World Bank’s 
World Development Report (World Bank 2007) on agricultural development highlighted the 
need for agricultural transformations to meet these challenges. Unlike the previous discourse, 
the entry point here was initially not climate change. Climate change was identified by FAO 
and later the World Bank as a factor compounding the challenges, increasing the urgency of 
the need to find new solutions and providing the entry point to CSA.  
This discourse can be characterised by the convergence of a number of agricultural 
development strategies, notably conservation agriculture (CA), sustainable intensification and 
a range of agroforestry systems, are being re-defined as inherently ‘climate-smart’, i.e. as ‘off 
the shelf’ CSA strategies and practices.  
Sustainable intensification helps to illustrate well the characteristics but also contradictions 
inherent within this CSA discourse. Sustainable intensification is, as Campbell et al. (2014: 
41) argue, a “cornerstone of CSA, as increased resource use efficiency contributes to both 
adaptation and mitigation via effects on farm incomes and reduced emissions per unit 
product.” The synergy effect on adaptation is described in terms of ‘increased income’ and the 
synergy effect on mitigation in terms of ‘per unit product’. This points to a construction of 
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triple wins where adaptation has become synonymous with increased income, and the focus 
on reduction in GHG emissions per product.  
In sustainable intensification, we find justification for an efficiency- or consequence-based 
view on distributive equity, both in terms of more economic efficiency in terms of income per 
product, and in terms of gains coming through predominantly high-input, technology-focused 
interventions. Most commentators agree that the majority of this will need to come from 
increased efficiency, including innovative crop science advances, if yields are to increase 
without adverse environmental impact or the cultivation of new land. Novel research methods 
have, the argument goes, the potential to contribute to food production through forms of 
genetic improvement, including the genetic modification of crops that have been altered to 
introduce new and desirable traits. The focus on increased efficiency and high-input 
agricultural production sit awkwardly alongside approaches focused on improved access to 
resources and safeguarding of access to crop genetic diversity, including traditional varieties.  
A related argument is that for farmers to benefit from new practices and technologies, access 
to markets needs to improve. This has brought many to support market expansion and 
integration as a means to increase farmers’ participation in economies of scale (c.f. Nyasimi et 
al. 2014; FAO 2014). Market integration is presented as a ‘climate-smart’ strategy to alleviate 
poverty and food insecurity through adoption of CSA technologies such as drought tolerant 
varieties (intensification of production), and providing access to markets for producers to sell 
their output (adaptation through increased income). This has been associated with a push to 
commercialise small-scale agriculture and steer production away from subsistence crops to 
cash crops. However, this has implications for procedural equity in that it presumes access to 
supporting institutions. In the above-mentioned Nepal case, cultivation technologies including 
new fertilization techniques and plastic tarps for tomatoes were aimed at small-scale 
production for sale at local markets. To initiate such processes, financial institutions have also 
highlighted the importance of developing financial mechanisms through which farmers can 
fund these technologies.  
Yet, sustainable intensification can take many forms and be pursued in a number of ways. On 
the one hand, sustainable intensification is presented as a way for farmers to increase their 
earnings from production without contributing to environmental degradation through 
encroachment into forested or other non-agricultural landscapes. On the other hand, as put 
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forward in a 2009 report from the UK Royal Society (Royal Society 2009), there is a 
discourse arguing for the sustainable intensification of the global agricultural system. From a 
‘globalist’ perspective, the challenge is presented as the largely technical one of how to meet 
future demand for food on an area of land that is unlikely to expand (Campbell et al. 2014). 
Within this framing, science and technology are presented as having a primary role to play in 
meeting these challenges. Practices promoted as sustainable intensification rarely seek to 
promote agroecology, organic agriculture or permaculture, which some critics argue are far 
more climate friendly and sustainable than high input or high yielding practices promoted 
through CSA tied to sustainable intensification (Stabinsky 2014; ISA 2014). 
The ‘global sustainable intensification’ narrative has been powerful in the CSA debate. This 
may be at least in part because the ‘problems’ underpinning CSA are primarily framed as 
global ones, necessitating global solutions. One way to ‘sustainably’ intensify production 
from a globalist perspective is through technology transfer and innovation. The challenges 
inherent in the need for location-specific solutions, acknowledging the diversity of livelihood 
vulnerabilities of small-scale farmers and their needs are obscured within such a globalist 
perspective, making it difficult to address contextual equity issues at that scale. 
4.3 Promoting agro-industry  
In many respects, CSA from its conception opened up space for agro-industry to take a 
leading role in defining what counts as CSA. The initial FAO documents outlining CSA 
acknowledged that a large share of new funding for CSA would need to come from the 
private sector (FAO 2010). As a result, global agro-businesses were invited to articulate what 
activities should be funded under the framework of CSA, and hence shape what was to be 
included and excluded in its translation from policy to practice.  
Agribusiness companies, including Yara, Monsanto and Syngenta, have branded their 
fertilizers, pesticides and GM crops ‘climate-smart’ since they can be applied to increase 
production and reduce on-farm GHG emissions through various synergy mechanisms. One 
commonly cited synergy mechanism is found in herbicide-tolerant crops which reduce the 
need till the soil (see e.g. Neate 2013). Anderson (2014), for example, refers to a Monsanto 
seed that is resistant to the herbicide Glyphosate. The logic is that the crop can be sprayed 
with the herbicide as it grows, so that the weeds die back, but the crop remains standing. This 
practice reduces the need to till the soil for weeds, and hence reduce carbon leakage from the 
  28 
soil. Using this seed in combination with the Glyphosate herbicide, the author claims, has 
been brought forward by Monsanto as a ‘climate-smart’ non-till practice that will enable 
farmers to earn extra money from carbon offsets.  These claims are all part of a CSA 
discourse revolving around intensification through production efficiency, and fitting in well 
with neo-Malthusian ideas that population pressure increases demands on agricultural lands. 
Retailers such as Wal-Mart Stores, Kellogg’s and McDonalds have also used CSA to justify 
activities various ‘climate-smart’ activities. McDonalds, for example, has pledged to start 
purchasing beef from ‘sustainable’ sources consistent with the principles of CSA. What a 
sustainable source is, and how this fits within a CSA framework remains unclear, however. 
Such neo-Malthusian assumptions underpinning agricultural intensification drives have 
benefited various actors in the global agro-industrial supply chain, but have left little space for 
participation of farmers. Chemical fertilizers, pesticides and even genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) can now be cast as ‘climate smart’ under a CSA framework whereas they 
have been under attack from many agricultural sustainability advocates who argue that the 
externalities that accompany such technologies outweigh their benefits, with farmers ending 
up bearing the costs. Chemical inputs are known to leach soils of nutrients over time and to 
cause problems of pest resistance. These kinds of sustainability critiques can easily be side 
stepped by agro-industry when they can promote their products as climate smart, but raises 
important concerns over distributive equity. 
Spearheading this process is the Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture (GACSA), an 
alliance between the private (mainly agro-industrial) sector, UN agencies, the World Bank, 
national governments and a number of civil society organizations. GACSA was formed in 
2014 and works to stimulate governments and other institutional bodies to operationalize and 
scale up CSA practices through the promotion knowledge, research and development in 
technology, practice and policy; fostering technology transfer, information sharing and 
technical assistance; improving effectiveness of public and private investments; and 
integrating CSA into policy and planning at all levels. GACSA works, in short, to spread 
CSA. With members including International Agri-Food Network, International Fertilizer 
Industry Association (IFA), The World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD) and Yara International, GACSA is heavily influenced by corporate interests. 
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Fundamentally these mechanisms assume that the problem within agriculture is low 
productivity and low financial returns on produce. The framing of the problem means 
proposed interventions are technical in nature, focusing on innovation and technology 
transfer, such as mitigation through carbon sequestration and capture and use of agro-
chemicals. This suggests a largely market-based approach to CSA and the distribution of 
benefits, and also an implicit focus on farmers’ practices as part of the problem rather than the 
solution. The literature suggests that linking farmers to markets is a common approach to 
mainstream CSA across economically marginal localities. As explained in relation to a cocoa 
certification program under a CSA label in Ghana: “The goal was to create a sustainable 
landscape that harnessed the transformative power of markets” (Noponen et al. 2014).  From 
this perspective, CSA’s job is to ‘create’ and ‘expand’ markets for small-scale farmers to 
benefit from, imitate public-private partnerships, and to align producers and buyers. However, 
the ability of farmers to benefit from these markets relies on a number of other, pre-existing 
structures that are rarely fully acknowledged in this narrative. The promotion of industrial 
agricultural practices among small holders’ integration in agricultural markets will often be 
structured along class, caste and gender lines. Markets are not simply open spaces where all 
entrepreneurial-minded people can improve their livelihoods. Rather, pre-existing social 
hierarchies are played out within markets, allowing some people improvement and further 
impoverishing others (Sugden 2009). Without particular attention to these constraints, it is 
therefore highly likely that CSA efforts will similarly serve to fracture communities and 
increase, rather than address, structural and contextual inequity. 
4.4 Smallholder and community-based CSA approaches  
As seen above, there has been considerable opposition within the NGO community to CSA in 
general, and GACSA in particular. Despite these vociferous critiques, other actors have 
mobilised the discourse at the grassroots level, converting campaigns of gender empowerment 
and conservation agriculture into organizations for effecting change within a CSA framework. 
The starting point for this ‘community based’ discourse is that there are many examples of 
agroecology practices (including also agroforestry practices) that adhere to the principles of 
CSA but at the same time distance themselves from the use of agro-chemicals and carbon 
market-based solutions. These discourses tend to put questions of equity more in the centre 
frame. 
  30 
Opposing the production efficiency narrative, one body of literature argues that to improve 
food security, CSA needs to prioritize the design and implementation of adaptation to enable 
farmers to learn to cope with a warmer and more volatile climate (see e.g. Timmer 2013; Shea 
2014). Such practices include increasing soil water-holding capacity, engaging in 
conservation tillage, planting cover crops, diversifying cropping systems etc. These practices 
are distinct from production efficiency in that they focus on the use of agricultural inputs like 
water and soil, rather than production outputs. Not doing so, it is argued, will threaten longer-
term goals of food security. However, here we again see the emphasis on technologies, rather 
than social relations. Studies of equity have shown conclusively that new technologies are 
often taken up by more powerful local actors, serving to further reinforce local hierarchies 
(Peterman et al. 2014). 
Another approach rejects external, expert-oriented solutions and focuses on local level actors 
instead. Field experience, yet very limited, suggests that CSA is not necessarily perceived as 
something new at the community level. Adekola and Terdoo (2014) quoted one farmer saying 
that “This thing (CSA) is just another name for the way we practice our traditional 
agriculture”. In the same study, another farmer said that “These are some of the things we 
have inherited from our forefathers […], to us it is normal and we see nothing new about it” 
(Adekola and Terdoo 2014). Many thus believe that the ‘solutions’ to climate change related 
agricultural crises are found in local traditional practices of conservation agriculture, which 
needs to be scaled up. From this perspective, CSA is ultimately about embracing and 
harnessing indigenous knowledge (Domfeh 2015), and scaling up existing practices, rather 
than finding new solutions or exporting expert knowledge. 
These counter discourses, however, are largely subsumed by the three above-mentioned, 
arguably dominant narratives of CSA on the global scale. Standard frameworks of market-
based, and techno-centric solutions for addressing food security and poverty problems are still 
put forward on larger scales, while agroecology, organic agriculture, and permaculture 
struggle to find space. The subsuming of traditional practices to standard frameworks was 
evident in the Nepal case we visited. While still in the early stages of implementation, we 
were struck by the emphasis on market integration and new agricultural technologies as 
opposed to fostering traditional agricultural products which the NGO’s other programs 
promote. 
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Another important equity aspect of many CSA discourses surrounds property rights. Despite 
decades of research showing that the commons work (Ostrom 1990), private property rights 
are often assumed to be necessary for good environmental management while collective 
property is more circumspect. Scherr et al. (2012) assert that clearly defined ownership rights 
are “critical for successful, long-term management. Secure tenure allows land managers to 
look towards a future where they can build profitable, climate-resilient systems”. Insecure 
property rights, they continue, “pose a barrier to adoption of climate-smart practices, as there 
is little incentive to invest time and money to transition management practices.” Actors 
advocating for efficient resource management thus tend to argue that the lack of clearly 
demarcated ownership rights on common and customary property resources impede the 
progress towards CSA, as it is easier to manage resources with clearly defined boundaries and 
usufruct rights. As Rajasekhar et al. (2012) argue in relation to south India, contesting claims 
on land ownership surrounding common property resources “leads to the preference to take up 
works not relating to natural resource management and assigning higher priority to private 
lands having clear-cut property rights. While the former impedes the progress towards 
climate-smart agriculture, the latter makes it less inclusive” (p.16). CSA is thus often used as 
an excuse for regularizing property rights in places where access to collective lands is vital for 
the poorest of the poor. Once again, the literature on property rights suggests that equity 
dilemmas are not solved by tenure rights efforts alone (Peters 2009). Rather, the complexities 
of overlapping tenure claims, national versus local understandings of tenure and intra-
household access issues raise equally complex equity questions (Peluso and Lund 2011). 
Thus, while certainly debated, the assigning of tenure in itself does not solve problems of 
uneven access to resources and benefits (Larson et al. 2013).   
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5. Conclusions  
The aim of this paper has been to unpack equity implications around key discourses 
surrounding climate-smart agriculture. The motivation was that with its broad definition, CSA 
implies a wide set of very different practices, and as a result, has come under intense scrutiny 
and criticism. One of the key areas of contention is its implications for social equity. 
However, equity is rarely defined in the CSA literature, and the broad definition of CSA, 
notably from the FAO, provides little guidance for addressing equity questions.  
The paper is addressing these gaps by unpacking the equity concept and what it means in 
relation to four key CSA discourses, focusing on, respectively, climate mitigation policy 
goals, agricultural development and transformation, agri-business, and finally, smallholder 
and community-based CSA. We applied an equity framework consisting of three dimensions 
of equity: distributional, procedural and contextual. Some of these are articulated, e.g. around 
participation and benefits, but many remain implicit in the CSA literature, which the analysis 
sought to bring out.  
Our contention is that these four different discourses, or ‘versions’ of CSA, have different 
equity implications, raising different questions and concerns as summarised in Table 1 below. 
Importantly, none of the discourses address all three dimensions of equity with any degree of 
robustness. Rather, they are entrenched within existing paradigms and practices, and are likely 
to reproduce and exacerbate existing inequalities rather than challenging them. 
Despite differences between the four discourses, some broad patterns can be drawn out. 
Common to the first three (climate policy, agricultural development, agro-industry) are a 
strong focus on efficiency-based distributive equity, while the last (smallholder CSA) tends to 
focus more on needs-based distributive equity. In all four discourses, there are efforts to 
increase participation of vulnerable and marginalised groups, but with arguably less attention 
to this in agribusiness-related discourses, which focuses on existing participation in markets. 
In terms of contextual equity, with a few exceptions the four discourses predominantly 
assume working within current institutional and political structures, with as yet very limited 
focus on transformation of underlying structures to improve resource access. 
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Table 1. CSA discourses and key equity implications  
CSA discourse 
(key actors)  
Characteristics Distributive 
equity 
Procedural equity Contextual equity 
 
CSA as 
opportunity to 
address 
climate policy 
goals  
 
(FAO, World 
Bank, CCAFS, 
IFAD) 
Focus on 
adaptation and 
food security, 
and mitigation 
as co-benefit 
Focus on 
large scale 
interventions 
External 
knowledge 
High input 
agriculture 
Instrumental 
over moral 
equity 
concerns 
 
Works within 
current structures 
Attention to land 
rights secondary 
Rescaling of 
responsibility 
Increasing 
recognition of 
gender and social 
inclusion 
Limited focus on 
structural 
constraints 
Tends to focus on 
proximate over 
root causes, 
climate as driver 
of vulnerability 
CSA as a way 
of promoting 
agricultural 
development 
goals  
 
(FAO, World 
Bank, CCAFS, 
IFAD) 
Local/regional, 
CSA as entry 
point for 
agricultural 
transformation. 
Example 
sustainable 
intensification 
Focus on 
improved 
market access 
for farmers 
Improved 
access to 
inputs 
Value chains 
Linkages to land 
and water rights 
Access to advisory 
services and credit  
Focus on 
transformation of 
agricultural sector 
structures working 
within current 
structures 
Private sector 
and the carbon 
markets as 
engines of 
growth 
 
(Bi-lateral 
donors, agri-
business 
actors) 
Global to local 
marketisation of 
carbon 
 
Focus on 
instrumental 
equity 
concerns 
 
Implicit 
recognition of 
farmers’ practice 
as the problem 
Little space for 
farmer 
participation  
Assumes ability of 
farmers to connect 
to carbon markets 
 
CSA as an 
opportunity to 
increase 
support to 
smallholders  
 
(iNGOs – e.g. 
CARE, AACSA) 
Local - 
Supporting 
smallholder 
initiatives 
Strong focus 
on 
distributive 
equity from a 
moral 
perspective  
Focus on local 
knowledge 
Strong focus on 
local participation 
and deliberation 
Acknowledgement 
of gender 
constraints to 
participation 
Focus on structural 
inequalities 
Acknowledgement 
of gender 
inequalities 
But often weak on 
addressing 
underlying/root 
causes  
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CSA has arguably served as an effective ‘rallying cry’, bringing together a wide variety of 
organisations and actors with different interests and from different backgrounds, all with a 
stake in the agricultural sector, and a concern around food security and agricultural 
development in a changing climate (Neufeldt et al. 2013). As such, CSA can be seen as a 
boundary object (Cash et al. 2003), providing a platform for development of policies and 
strategies on agriculture and climate change. It is less clear, however, to what extent these 
meeting spaces are leading to the changes that are needed for the poorest and most marginal 
social groups. Thus, it may link up actors, but not provide sufficient guidance for change.  
In addition to providing more understanding around the equity aspects of CSA, we argue that 
when equity questions guide the definitions of CSA, implications for policy and practice 
become clearer. Going back to the original conceptualisation of CSA, namely initiatives and 
activities that lead to ‘triple wins’, and linking this to an understanding of equity that focuses 
attention to distributional, procedural and contextual dimensions, three concerns stand out. 
First, distributive equity implies a need to acknowledge how CSA may shift the responsibility 
for climate change mitigation from international and regional actors to national governments 
and NGOs and, in some cases, to those least able to respond to these expectations, poor local 
producers and resource managers. In terms of policy, this means that national and 
international actors need to be cautious about promoting CSA on the ground without 
addressing the global origins of climate change.  
Second, on procedural justice, while CSA is often portrayed as a force for transforming the 
agricultural sector, evidence suggests that it is unlikely to fundamentally shift power to 
address the key factors that constrain or block the emergence of more pro-poor agricultural 
development, adaptation to climate change, or carbon sequestration and storage. The 
dominant focus on market-based transformations, in particular, may lead to new risks and 
vulnerabilities, and entrench already unequal power structures. Third, to improve CSA 
outcomes, a focus on contextual equity means more attention needs to be given to the 
institutions that underpin the bargaining power of the poorest and most vulnerable groups, as 
well as a deeper acknowledgement of the political nature of transformations that are needed to 
address challenges around the agricultural sector in a changing climate.  
New governance architectures are required if CSA is to be pursued in ways that are just, 
socially inclusive and respectful of tradition and livelihoods. Although organisations such as 
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the FAO explicitly call for context-specific interventions and innovations, the 
operationalisation of CSA thus far has drawn heavily on conventional, top-down, technical 
solutions to achieve impact at scale. GACSA, for example, aims at enabling 500 million 
farmers to practice CSA by 2030. How to achieve that goal and at the same time take local 
socio-political contexts and agro-ecological diversity into account is almost impossible to 
imagine. Our analysis suggests that CSA is frequently framed as a global problem, 
stimulating actors to find global solutions that are easily traded. While practices such as 
agroecology and permaculture are inherently local but not easily exported, technological 
interventions are global in reach but are less sensitive to local socio-ecological particularities, 
including equity concerns, and hence risk exacerbating food insecurity and inequality. 
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